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We are emotional beings. Every action we take and every thought 
we have comes with emotions. Speculating on what the meaning 
of a ‘just society’ should be for human beings, however general 
such a theme may be, therefore requires a focus on emotions. In 
the next few pages, I shall limit my analysis to the relationship 
that obtains between disgust and the idea of a just society. Contra 
Martha C. Nussbaum (2006; 2010), who argues that disgust 
“pose[s] dangers to a just society” (Nussbaum 2006, 70), I shall 
contend that disgust can either damage or promote the construc-
tion of a just society. Indeed, I largely agree with Nussbaum’s per-
spective on disgust, but I put forward the idea that disgust is not 
necessarily dangerous for a just society, but can also be useful and 
constitute an important element for its construction. In order to 
justify my claim, first, I will comment on Nussbaum’s criticism of 
disgust. Second, I will analyse Rozin and Fallon’s (1987) seminal 
study on disgust, which Nussbaum fully presupposes. Third, I will 
propose a slightly different, indeed ‘holistic’ view on disgust, and 
bring forward some arguments for the use of disgust in order to 
construct a just society. 
 
1. Martha C. Nussbaum on Disgust, Law, and Society: A Sum-
mary and a Few Remarks 
Martha C. Nussbaum devoted at least two books (2006; 2010) to 
the relationship between disgust, politics, and the law. In those 
works, she also addressed the topic of a just society, which she 
conceives of as a liberal society, where every person can lead a 
flourishing life thanks to certain basic rights and liberties valid for 
all citizens. Such rights and liberties are supposed to be grounded 
neither on metaphysical conceptions nor on religious or secular 
assumptions. Rather, they should be the result of an “overlapping 
consensus” among the holders of different perspectives on how 
life should be lived, provided that they endorse at least the fun-
damental idea of “the equal worth of persons, and their liberty” 
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(Nussbaum 2006, 62). By this way, political culture only retains 
the sharable values among these different views without taking 
any stands on contending matters (e.g., with regard to religion, the 
nature of the soul, etc.; Nussbaum 2006, 62). Thus it is all but dif-
ficult to see why the political liberalism defended by Nussbaum 
has a strong interest in the role of the law for a just society to be 
established and preserved, and why, accordingly, disgust is highly 
problematic for this political stance. While the law should protect 
the rights, liberties and primary goods of all citizens, disgust 
seems to undermine the very idea that, among citizens, there 
should be full equality in worth and liberty. From this point of 
view, disgust “pose[s] dangers to a just society” (Nussbaum 2006, 
70) since it is “in many respects especially antithetical to the val-
ues of a liberal society” (Nussbaum 2006, 321), whose fabric is the 
law and whose guiding commitments are “reciprocity and mutual 
respect, including respect for differing conception of the ultimate 
good of life” (Nussbaum 2006, 321).  
Now, the problem arises because disgust “plays a powerful 
role in the law” (Nussbaum 2006, 72). Nussbaum aims to engage 
in a cultural battle against this “institutional” role of disgust, so to 
speak, which “figures, first, as the primary or even the sole justifi-
cation for making an act illegal” (Nussbaum 2006, 72). This is a 
problem of both cultural (in a large sense) and a juridical (in a 
technical sense) relevance insofar as, whether or not we are 
aware of it, disgust also plays a powerful role in our lives and con-
sequently it can both be elicited during a legal process or be one of 
the deep reason for supporting or making a law (e.g., the law 
against obscenity, sodomy and same-sex marriage, etc.). If the law 
must protect citizens first of all because of their dignity as citizens, 
then it cannot be driven by an emotion that first and foremost at-
tacks and insults said dignity. This criticism of disgust finds its 
concrete exemplification in Nussbaum (2010), where she focuses 
on “the ways in which [disgust] has been used politically through 
history” (Nussbaum 2010, 15) in order to subordinate vulnerable 
minorities and contend that constitutional law has “a significant 
role to play in the transformation” of social attitudes starting from 
the specific theme of the sexual orientation (Nussbaum 2010, 21). 
Nussbaum (2006) provides at least three arguments to clar-
ify why disgust is antithetical to the values of a liberal society. The 
first two arguments rely on Rozin and Fallon’s seminal paper on 
disgust (1987; s. next section). Nussbaum explicitly refers to their 
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study when she states that disgust “does not well track genuine 
danger” and that “it is bound up with irrational forms of magical 
thinking” (Nussbaum 2006, 122). These are respectively the first 
and the second argument against the reliability of disgust in rela-
tion to making an act illegal. The first argument claims that dis-
gust is unreliable for legal purposes because its elicitors do not 
always coincide with something genuinely dangerous. In line with 
Rozin and Fallon, Nussbaum brings attention to the fact that dis-
gust is not the same as danger and, therefore, fear. While danger-
ous items can be tolerated in my environment and stop being 
dangerous as soon as their danger element has been removed, 
disgusting ones cannot be tolerated, nor are they less disgusting 
after all danger was removed (Nussbaum 2006, 88). Disgust, at 
most, “provides an additional emphasis to the sense of danger [...,] 
even though the disgusting does not map precisely onto the dan-
gerous” (Nussbaum 2006, 95). If there is no genuine danger un-
derlying a reaction of disgust, one cannot use it as a justification to 
establish whether or not an act is illegal, because there is no ac-
tual reason for such a justification. Following Rozin and Fallon 
(1987, 29-30), Nussbaum puts forward a second argument against 
disgust, that of “magical thinking”. Disgust is elicited by objects 
that are perceived as contaminants. Yet, an object does not need 
to be a contaminant per se in order to elicit disgust, but it suffices 
that we think that the object is contaminating to feel disgust. Ro-
zin and Fallon call this phenomenon “psychological contamina-
tion”, and classify it as a form of magical thinking, that is to say, a 
pattern of thought that projects the property of being contaminat-
ing on both disgusting objects or objects that had past contact 
with disgusting objects, be they really contaminants or not. Ac-
cordingly, it is no surprise that Nussbaum states that disgust does 
not provide “the disgusted person with a set of reasons that can 
be used for purposes of public persuasion” (Nussbaum 2006, 
101). Disgust thus entails a magical root that makes it unreliable 
for legal purposes. 
The third reason for rejecting disgust within a legal frame-
work is strictly political. Nussbaum distrusts disgust insofar as it 
serves an “elaborate social engineering” (Nussbaum 2006, 110) 
that puts some groups down (e.g., Jews in late nineteenth century 
Europe) by distancing them from the dominant group, which de-
scribes them “in such a way that they came to be found disgust-
ing” (Nussbaum 2006, 111). In other words, disgust colludes with 
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social and political forces that deny dignity to some persons and 
groups (usually the more vulnerable ones). This is at odds with 
the values of a liberal society because a group (the dominant 
group, e.g., healthy German males grown-up during the late nine-
teenth century) considers another group (the downgraded group, 
e.g., Jews at the time) neither as entitled to the same rights nor as 
worthy as it is. Disgust can foster the prohibition of harmless acts 
or even (as has happened) make it so that harmless people are le-
gally treated as criminals by means of the law itself.  
In Nussbaum’s perspective, therefore, disgust does not fos-
ter discriminatory behaviours on the basis of a genuine danger 
but because of a psychical and culturally mediated idea of conta-
gion. Its claim sounds like this: “This act (or, more often and usu-
ally inseparably, this person) is a contaminant; it (he or she) pol-
lutes our community. We would be better off if this contamination 
were kept far away from us” (Nussbaum 2006, 122-123). Still, 
since disgust relies on cultural and irrational beliefs, this claim has 
no value at all in making disgust a valid criterion to establish 
which acts should or should not be prohibited. Following Rozin 
and Fallon, Nussbaum believes that disgust “begins with a group 
of core objects, which are seen as contaminants because they are 
seen as reminders of our mortality and animal vulnerability” 
(Nussbaum 2006, 93). The disgusting object is a “reminder” of 
human mortality and vulnerability as an animal, issues that Nuss-
baum – like most – considers really difficult to live with (Nuss-
baum 2006, 95). Yet, neither all animals nor those traits that we 
share with them are always disgusting. In this sense, distancing 
herself from Rozin and Fallon’s account (s. next section), Nuss-
baum (2006, 92) contends that decay is the crucial concept that 
allows to properly connect mortality and animal vulnerability 
with disgust. Disgusting beings remind us that we are vulnerable 
and mortal insofar as they are rotting or are phenomenally similar 
to rotting beings (e.g., insects). Furthermore, if we come into con-
tact with such things (or persons), we would be contaminated by 
them, that is to say, we would come to be transformed into them. 
However, these are cultural biases and irrational thoughts: the 
truth, according to Nussbaum, is that we desperately struggle 
against our own humanity, to the point of “hiding from [our own] 
humanity”, as the title of Nussbaum’s book (2006) points out. 
Though consistent and compelling, I do not find Nussbaum’s 
view on disgust really convincing. Her goal being to delegitimate 
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both the more or less explicit presence of disgust behind some 
laws and the idea that such an emotion can provide a good crite-
rion for establishing that something is illegal or even criminal, 
these two purposes converge with her struggle against social en-
gineering and discrimination. However, the very reason for ac-
knowledging that disgust plays a powerful and central role in 
these issues is all but clear. According to Nussbaum, the concept of 
(psychological) “contamination” should provide such a reason 
and, at the same time, the reason for getting rid of disgust in the 
(public) contexts she considers. Were disgust the emotion that re-
acts to contaminants, which are seen as such mostly due to cul-
tural and psychological biases, then disgust would not give us true 
information about our environment and the beings that inhabit it, 
and would therefore be disqualified from constituting a potential 
resource for judging it in any possible sense, let alone for a group 
to downgrade other groups. What seems to be troubling in this 
hypothesis is that Nussbaum puts together two fully different di-
mensions: that of psychological life and that of social life. As her 
understanding of disgust shows, she seems to take for granted 
that these two layers of human life are somehow contiguous and 
function in the same way. In other words, she overlaps the way in 
which disgust works in our own life with the way in which it 
works and spreads socially.  
Accordingly, Jews, homosexuals, women, lower-class people, 
and all downgraded human groups would have been discrimi-
nated only because of their (imagined) contaminating properties, 
which not only would remind the dominant (disgusted) group of 
its vulnerability, animality and mortality, but would ultimately 
weaken it. Though, I would contend that Nussbaum’s tight analogy 
(not to say identity) between socio-political and psychological 
(personal) disgust is implausible. Nussbaum states: “So powerful 
is the desire to cordon ourselves off from our animality that we of-
ten don’t stop at feces, cockroaches, and slimy animals. We need a 
group of humans to bound ourselves against, who will come to ex-
emplify the boundary line between the truly human and the 
basely animal” (Nussbaum 2006, 107). Let us focus on this “need 
[of] a group of humans to bound ourselves against”. According to 
Nussbaum, it arises because of the desire to separate oneself that 
underlies disgust itself. Now, consider a group of teenagers that 
bully one or more of their schoolmates by insulting them and at-
tributing to them several disgusting properties. There is probably 
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no disgust at play here. In this case, the trigger is a sort of power 
struggle grounded on a need for self-affirmation that is widely 
common at that age, fostering the creation of groups and making 
the dominant ones downgrade the vulnerable. Disgust is a simple 
mean (likely the most popular one) for discriminating, a means 
that does not need to be actually felt in order to be used. The so-
cial and cultural discourses and behaviours motivated by disgust 
and connected to this emotion can be detached from the actual 
experience of it and be used for discrimination purposes. Self-
affirmation as well as power dynamics among teens can easily be 
understood as a need to hide from vulnerability in Nussbaum’s 
sense, a need that discriminatory behaviours satisfy psychologi-
cally (by reinforcing one’s own self-esteem) and socially (by pro-
viding social consideration).  
In cases like these, however, it is clear that disgust does not 
play any role as an actual emotion. Instead, people refer to it in 
order to both affirm themselves and mask their real intention, 
which could be morally reproached or even legally prosecuted. 
Consider Nussbaum’s example of the German Jews during Nazism: 
“It is not because in some intrinsic way Jews were actually or 
‘originally’ or ‘primarily’ found disgusting that they came to be as-
sociated with stereotypes of the disgusting. The causality is more 
the other way around: it was because there was a need to associ-
ate Jews [...] with stereotypes of the animal [...] that they were rep-
resented and talked about in such a way that they came to be 
found disgusting” (Nussbaum 2006, 110-111). Again, the point is 
to investigate the ‘need’ that is able to make someone disgusting. 
As I have briefly shown, the reasons and affective qualities that lie 
behind such social phenomenon cannot be identical with the ac-
tual reaction that one experiences before something disgusting. 
Consequently, in Nussbaum’s words, the disgusting may be a 
plausible reason for hiding my humanity, but it is no plausible 
reason for hiding the humanity of a group – let alone a whole so-
cial body. But Nussbaum’s understanding of disgust presents 
other problems: first of all, with regards to the idea of a just soci-
ety, she only describes disgust as a negative emotion. I aim to 
question exactly this point. In order to do that, in the next section, 
I will consider Rozin and Fallon’s seminal study on disgust, which 
is the basis of Nussbaum’s own thesis. 
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2. Rozin and Fallon’s ‘A Perspective on Disgust:’ A Critical 
Reading in Search of a Holistic View. 
Taking distance from Nussbaum’s account on disgust involves a 
critical consideration of Rozin and Fallon’s own perspective. Let 
us start from their definition of this emotion: “Revulsion at the 
prospect of (oral) incorporation of an offensive object. The offen-
sive objects are contaminants; that is, if they even briefly contact 
an acceptable food, they tend to render that food unacceptable” 
(Rozin and Fallon 1987, 23). Therefore, disgust is an emotion that 
has a defensive function: it defends us from incorporating offen-
sive objects. Rozin and Fallon’s article mainly consists in exploring 
the critical terms of their definition: (1) oral incorporation into 
the self, (2) offensive object, (3) contaminant/contagion (Rozin 
and Fallon 1987, 24). In this section I will comment on their 
analyses of these concepts and try to bring forward a slightly dif-
ferent “perspective on disgust”. 
Generally speaking, Rozin and Fallon consider disgust a par-
ticular type of food rejection. They claim that disgust is a food-
related emotion and that disgusting items are potential foods or 
things that could contaminate foods. Still, the very reason for such 
a rejection is to be found in what they call “ideational factors”, that 
is to say “on the knowledge of the origin or the nature of the food, 
illustrated by the rejection of a grasshopper just because it is a 
grasshopper” (Rozin and Fallon 1987, 24). This means that the 
ideational factor is cultural: it pertains to the very idea (be it true 
or not) that we have about a certain object. In this case, that the 
object is a contaminant and, therefore, disgusting. In other words, 
we perceive an object as negative (in this case, as disgusting) be-
cause, according to our knowledge of its origin or nature, we see it 
as offensive. Yet, this knowledge of the origin or nature of the ob-
ject comes from the culture we have grown up and live in: thus, 
we know that an object is offensive (i.e., disgusting) only because 
we have been taught that it has an offensive nature or origin in-
asmuch as it is  contaminating and therefore disgusting. Neverthe-
less, despite this strong cultural component, Rozin and Fallon do 
not concede that disgust is fully reducible to a cultural construc-
tion. Instead, there is a strong psycho-biological basis that allows 
the ideational factors underlying disgust to take root. As we shall 
see, the two psychologists also inquire into how these two dimen-
sions of disgust intertwine with each other. 
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Indeed, the first point to clarify in Rozin and Fallon’s defini-
tion of disgust is that of “oral incorporation”. This term indicates 
the first psycho-biological element that has to be analysed in or-
der to produce a correct account of disgust. According to them, the 
oral incorporation in the self always implies cutting across the 
very border of the body and, consequently, the border between 
self and non-self (Rozin and Fallon 1987). Now, Rozin and Fallon 
explain why disgust focuses on the mouth and on oral incorpora-
tion by hypothesizing the existence of a “simple and primitive no-
tion” that they call “unacknowledged belief”, according to which 
“one assumes the properties of what one ingests” (Rozin and 
Fallon 1987, 27). In short, human beings universally seem to be-
lieve that “you are what you eat”, and consequently they expect 
“ingestion of offensive (say, disgusting) objects to cause one to be-
come offensive (debased) in some way. The act of ingestion would 
transfer the offensiveness to the self” (Rozin and Fallon 1987, 27). 
By way of explanation, the underlying idea is that, just as an ac-
ceptable food becomes unacceptable if it enters in contact with a 
disgusting object, so human beings, if contacted by such objects, 
become as unacceptable. 
Were Rozin and Fallon right, the focus of disgust on the oral 
incorporation of an object should be motivated by a much deeper 
focus on the self. Surprisingly, they do not stress this aspect of the 
issue. Instead, they only underscore the close connection between 
oral incorporation and the nature of the offensive object, which is 
the second term they aim to clarify in their contribution. Rozin 
and Fallon (1987, 27-28) state that disgust has an animal focus, 
that is to say, that it is mainly directed to animals, parts of animals 
and (human and animal) bodily wastes. When non-animal objects 
are disgusting – the two psychologists state – they normally had 
contact with, or are similar to, those entities: “In addition to the 
claim that all disgusts are of animal origin, we believe that all 
animals and animal products are potentially disgusting. That is, at 
some basic level (and perhaps at some point in human evolution) 
animalness was a necessary and sufficient condition for disgust” 
(Rozin and Fallon 1987, 28). They support their statement with 
some arguments concerning the fact that human beings univer-
sally eat only a small part of the available (and nutritional) animal 
species. Subsequently, eating animals would be the exception to 
the general rule according to which human beings do not nor-
mally eat animals (Rozin and Fallon 1987, 28). On this basis, they 
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argue for the tight connection between animals and food: animals 
appear to be really disgusting insofar as they may become food to 
be eaten by humans. Indeed: 
 
Why animals? If we assume that there is a widespread belief that 
people take on the properties of what they eat, we must explain 
why animals, but not plants, are disgusting. Perhaps our greater 
similarity to animals makes it more likely that we would take on 
their properties. The fact that they produce feces may also be im-
portant. [...] In contrast to plants, animals seem to have more rele-
vant and salient characteristics of the sort that might be expressed 
in a human. Another explanation assumes that humans see them-
selves as quite distinct from (and superior to) other animals and 
wish to avoid any ambiguity about their status by accentuating the 
human-animal boundary. (Rozin and Fallon 1987, 28) 
 
One of the problems of Rozin and Fallon’s interpretation consists 
in giving an account of this animal focus of disgust. Why are ani-
mals disgusting, but plants aren’t? Their first answer resides in 
the idea of similarity: “perhaps”, they write, humans acknowledge 
their greater similarity to animals than to plants. This hypothesis 
is consistent with the idea that we are endowed with an unac-
knowledged belief that leads us both to behave and to uncon-
sciously assume that we take on the properties of what we eat. 
Therefore, our greater similarity to animals makes it more likely 
for us to take on their properties by eating them, to the (ideal) ex-
tent of the suppression of our difference from them.  
Rozin and Fallon add a second hypothesis to account for the 
strict relationship between animalness and disgust: humans see 
themselves as distinct form (which may imply superior to) other 
animals and wish to accentuate such difference. This hypothesis is 
also consistent with the idea that “we are what we eat”, since eat-
ing animals would reduce the perceived distance between humans 
and animals. Both explanations highlight the humans’ belief in 
their difference from animals and their effort to keep such differ-
ence clear and neat, and this appears to be the very meaning of 
disgust according to the two psychologists. One may add that, be-
hind such a (conflictual) relationship with animals, which humans 
normally are thought of as being akin to, it is possible to recognise 
a problem of identity and difference – a problem that disgust im-
mediately raises and makes explicit. 
This becomes even clearer if we follow Rozin and Fallon’s 
list of other possible theories that challenge their own, in view of a 
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full account of disgust. The first concurrent theory is that of 
“spoilage and decay” (Rozin and Fallon 1987, 28). It affirms that 
spoiled and decayed items are elicitors of disgust. In order to link 
it to the “animal focus” hypothesis, Rozin and Fallon immediately 
connect these items to animals, which all are potentially decayed, 
and add that many of them consume decayed material or garbage 
and produce putrid faeces. However, they state that, alone, this 
theory cannot account for the full range of disgusts, even though 
they do not say why. Instead, they do not observe that, if this the-
ory accounts for at least a part of disgust phenomena, it invali-
dates Rozin and Fallon’s presupposition that disgust has to do 
first and foremost with oral incorporation. Indeed, spoiled and 
decayed materials are perceived as disgusting because one might 
come into contact with them (most of the time), rather than be-
cause one might eat them. Here, of course, eating can be under-
stood as a borderline case of touching. Consequently, this theory 
seems to urge us to change Rozin and Fallon’s formulation of the 
unacknowledged belief from “you are what you eat” to “you are 
what you touch”. However one may put it, this is, once again, a 
matter of identity. 
The second concurrent theory Rozin and Fallon consider is 
that of the “Distance from humans”. According to the two psy-
chologists, such a theory can be summarised in the idea that “ac-
cepted sexual partners and accepted foods are at ‘intermediate 
distances’ from the self. It follows that food items and persons ei-
ther very close or very far from a person are rejected” (Rozin and 
Fallon 1987, 29). Once again, the theory of “intermediate dis-
tances” between humans and the accepted items accounts for 
some disgusting objects, but not all. Rozin and Fallon argue that 
“only a small minority of animals at ‘intermediate distances’ are 
usually acceptable as food, and many ‘distant’ animals such as 
shellfish and other invertebrates are commonly consumed” (Rozin 
and Fallon 1987, 29). This is a convincing argument, though it is 
easy to see that they understand the idea of “distance” in a very 
literal way. On the contrary, one may argue for a culturally medi-
ated understanding of this concept, and therefore as an “idea-
tional” concept of distance, to make use of Rozin and Fallon’s own 
conceptual background. This may complicate their view to the 
purpose of highlighting that categories such as “close to” and “far 
from” a person (and, I would add, a given society) are directly 
connected with the following two couples of categories: identity 
84 Marco Tedeschini 
 
 
and belongingness (closeness) and difference and extraneousness 
(farness). As the “animal focus” hypothesis also points out, the 
problem with disgust is that disgusting beings are not totally dif-
ferent from humans. By addressing the issue of the “intermediate 
distance” of the disgusting object from human beings, this hy-
pothesis stresses the importance to know how humans conceive 
of themselves in a given culture in order to know the class of dis-
gusting objects in that culture. In other words, the study of the 
way a culture teaches to humans who they are seems to provide 
instruments to recognise what in that same culture is thought to 
be disgusting. Once more, if I am right, what seems to be at stake 
with disgust is a matter of identity and difference. 
The third concurrent theory Rozin and Fallon consider is 
that of “anomaly”, which is drawn from Mary Douglas’ influential 
study on purity and danger (1966). Though Douglas does not fo-
cus on disgust but on tabooed and polluting objects, Rozin and 
Fallon think that her analyses might have implications for under-
standing disgust: “Her view is based on the assumed predilection 
of humans to create clear-cut classifications of the objects in their 
world. Anomalous items, such as those that are unique or those 
that simultaneously instantiate properties of different classes, are 
disturbing and hence become the objects of taboo or pollution” 
(Rozin and Fallon 1987, 29). Hypothesising a clear relationship 
between polluting items and disgusting ones, Rozin and Fallon 
wonder whether this theory provides a full explanation of disgust. 
Accordingly, they wonder whether one could speak of a disgusting 
object in terms of an object that instantiates properties partaking 
to different classes (what Douglas calls “anomaly”) among those 
which a given culture endows its members with in order to give 
them a clear-cut classification of the object in their world. As one 
might expect, their answer is no: they do not believe that the 
anomaly theory provides a full account of disgust. In fact, disgust-
ing items do not easily fall under the category of “anomaly” inso-
far as they are for the most part common objects of our experi-
ence (e.g., insects; Rozin and Fallon 1987, 29). Rozin and Fallon’s 
objection unveils the necessity that, for something to be disgust-
ing, it must be such that at least one of its properties belongs to 
our common environment. Disgusting objects are indeed mostly 
objects that belong to our ordinary experience. Notwithstanding 
that I might have never seen the disgusting object before (in this 
sense it would be probably an anomalous object as well), such ob-
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ject might be called disgusting and experienced as such only if it 
has at least one property (e.g., sliminess) that elicits disgust in me. 
But, sticking to Rozin and Fallon’s conceptual framework, the very 
reason why such properties elicit disgust consists in the ideational 
factor. In this sense, one may conclude that, notwithstanding that I 
might have never seen the disgusting object before, the latter 
might be called disgusting and experienced as such only if it has at 
least one property (e.g., sliminess) that I ‘consider’ disgusting, 
more or less consciously. Again, analysing disgust from this point 
of view focuses on what belongs to me and my environment – 
something that, as I shall contend in the concluding section of my 
paper, is strictly linked to the question concerning the way I con-
ceive myself. 
The fourth and last theory scrutinised by Rozin and Fallon 
(1987, 29) is that of “The primary disgust substance”, that is the 
“feces”, which are considered “close to being a universal disgust” 
and “probably the first object of disgust to appear”. The two psy-
chologists are very cautious with regard to this thesis and provide 
elements against the intuitive (and naive) evidence that it brings 
with it (Rozin and Fallon 1987, 36). Despite such evidence, in fact, 
disgust before feces seems to be no “innate rejection” (Rozin and 
Fallon 1987, 33), so it becomes difficult to decide whether feces 
are really entitled to be the first or primary object of disgust, al-
though it is clear that they belong to the first objects one learns to 
treat as disgusting. This process is dealt with in the section called 
“The Ontogeny of Disgust”, which is indeed very interesting inas-
much as it shows the crucial role of disgust in cultural transmis-
sion (between parents and children) and value acquisition. In this 
section it becomes clear that disgust only appears properly after 
the age of 8, when children are able to justify their rejection for 
something in terms of its nature or origin and when they can 
manage the category of “contamination” (Rozin and Fallon 1987, 
34-35), i.e. the third term defining disgust for the two psycholo-
gists, which we shall consider below. However, Rozin and Fallon 
state that “the most likely process [for the acquisition of the dis-
gust] is transmission of the disgust experience from one person to 
another (e.g., parent to child). There is evidence that something 
like this in fact happens inasmuch as disgust-contamination sensi-
tivity measures between parents and their young children show 
substantial positive correlations” (Rozin and Fallon 1987, 36; s. 
Stevenson et al. 2010 for an up-to-date account on this theme). 
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The ontogeny of disgust shows that disgust is acquired by inter-
personal transmission. This process, of course, requires the child’s 
long-lasting cognitive development in order to really occur. At the 
same time, this long-lasting development is not simply biological 
but also cultural, since children grow up in a ‘family’ (be it com-
posed by their natural parents or not) that teaches them what are 
the items that constitute their world and how to live in and relate 
to it. This implies that, at least in this case, natural development 
and cultural development of children overlap. Consequently, the 
primary objects of disgust should also be conceived of as the out-
come of this complex process that takes place in relation to our 
environment and, especially, our social environment. This point 
has the greatest implications for my critical reading of Rozin and 
Fallon’s “Perspective on Disgust” because, in their theoretical 
framework, there is room to connect the development of disgust 
in young humans with their cognitive development.  
Despite the special focus on disgust, one cannot overlook 
that it cannot be conceived of as a separate part of human psychic 
and cognitive life, which has no relation with the other parts and 
with the whole ontogenetic development of humans. Rather, it 
seems more plausible to think of disgust as if, at the same time, it 
contributed to shape, and were shaped by, the person one has be-
come in a given culture as well as in a given (social) environment. 
Indeed, growing up in culture is not a neutral fact for how one 
conceives of and ‘sense’ who one is. Think of language, a phe-
nomenon that is both universal and strictly cultural: according to 
the human ontogenetic developmental programme, on the physio-
logical side, it urges one’s facial muscles to learn some movement, 
instead of others, in order to pronounce this or that vocal, syllable, 
word and proposition, and, on the psychological side, it urges one 
to learn precise social and grammatical rules for communication 
purposes, which are rarely reproducible in other languages, even 
very similar ones (e.g., French and Italian). At the end of this social 
training, one has been substantially shaped, that is to say, one be-
comes a ‘native speaker’ of a certain language, which one calls 
‘mother tongue’, a language that mediates everything one experi-
ences and even seems to coalesce with it. Thus, a given language, 
formerly alien, has become ‘mine’. Something ‘cultural’ has be-
come ‘natural’ for me. Disgust seems to work in a very similar 
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way1: on the one side, it is difficult to say whether there are (and 
what are the) innate objects for this kind of rejection, but, on the 
other side, it is universal in human beings; disgusting objects vary 
from culture to culture; one learns (socially shared) appropriate 
responses to disgust, and, when they are not appropriate, they are 
frequently stigmatised by mockery and derision. At any rate, dis-
gust comes to be ‘natural’ as well, it becomes part of the equip-
ment I have developed in order to face life and relate with the en-
vironment I belong to. Once again, it has become ‘mine’. This 
means that it is one of my most intimate belongings, just as my 
language: it deeply characterises who I am and, at the same time, 
it unveils the group and the environment in which I grew up and 
am now living. 
My claim is that Rozin and Fallon do not make use of concep-
tual tools that are able to really consider disgust under the light of 
the several processes underlying the development of the personal 
subject (ultimately, the Ego, the ‘I’), influencing each other and, fi-
nally, shaping a person, including her personal instance of disgust 
along with other personal characteristics. This conception leads 
one to think differently of what disgust is: it is not a single mecha-
nism that develops by itself independently from other mechanism 
and from unforeseen events (e.g., external accidents as well as 
free choices), but rather a part of a whole, which likely could not 
even be thought of without such a whole. I call this view about 
disgust “holistic view”. The holistic view on disgust states that 
disgust cannot be adequately thought of without involving the 
whole human being and her development into consideration. This 
does not mean, at least not necessarily, that one cannot say any-
thing about disgust without explaining the relationship that dis-
gust entertains with the other parts of the whole (the human be-
ing) and their development. Rather, it means that one is commit-
ted to think of disgust in its dynamic involvement in the human 
being as a whole.  
The difference of the holistic view from the others becomes 
clear after considering the third term that defines Rozin and 
Fallon’s concept of disgust: “Contamination”. By this word, they 
mean the offensiveness that one feels when experiencing disgust 
in front of disgusting objects. According to the authors, “we use 
the word contamination to refer to psychological contamination, 
                                                     
1 For the analogy between disgust and language see Knapp (2003) and the critical re-
marks on Knapp’s view made by Gert (2005). 
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that is, people’s interpretation of or response to situations in 
which physical contamination may have occurred” (Rozin and 
Fallon 1987, 29).2 Rozin and Fallon understand contamination as 
a psychical process that may have a physical starting point (e.g. 
the contact between a disgusting substance and an acceptable 
food), but that, even in this case, does not really grasp per se a real 
contamination. Accordingly, however disgusting anything may 
appear, there is no such thing as an appropriate reaction of dis-
gust to it in a realistic sense, that is to say, there are no disgusting 
items (be they properties or objects) out there in the world.3 
                                                     
2 Incidentally, it is worth observing that this passage provides the theoretical and ex-
perimental basis for Nussbaum’s thesis that disgust does not provide the disgusted per-
son with a set of reasons that can be used for public purposes, namely the thesis from 
which I started my contribution. 
3 This description of disgust does not really disagree with the widely accepted idea that 
the evolutionary (phylogenetic) function of disgust is that of a disease-avoidance 
mechanism. Recent studies and much evidence (Curtis and Biran 2001; 2013; Kelly 
2011; Sarabian et al. 2017) have indubitably reinforced the idea that disgust, at its core, 
has its proper and universal objects. Such evidence suggests that disgust «should be 
viewed [...] as a system that evolved to detect signs of pathogens and other infectious 
agents, as well as to stimulate the expression of behaviours that reduce the risk of their 
acquisition» (Sarabian et al. 2017, 2). In these perspectives, the biological evolution of 
disgust is seen as crucial for its ontogeny and becomes the very basis for its develop-
ment and its subsequent cultural variation and extension. This kind of disgust would be 
directed on pathogens and infectious agents, that is to say, on animals that are not 
predators but that are nevertheless dangerous (s. particularly Kelly 2011, e.g., 51). Dis-
gust would thus be a system for biological contamination avoidance. Such descriptions, 
however based on compelling data, seem to be partial when applied to the human ex-
perience of disgust. On the one side, they correctly displace disgust before and beyond 
human beings by making it into a mechanism that may also be found in other animals. 
On the other side, they limit disgust by stating that the class of dangerous things it ap-
propriately refers to differs from that of, e.g., predators or natural events that are risky 
for our lives. But, in fact, it is very easy to make the disgusting and the dangerous over-
lap and, as is well known, there are plenty of situations in which this situation occurs 
(think of facing a snake or a spider). Rozin and Fallon already stigmatised such an ap-
proach in their seminal paper, by asking why “feces and other decayed substances are 
not treated simply as additional dangerous substances” (Rozin and Fallon 1987, 33; fur-
ther, s. again Nussbaum 2006, 88). In other words, the very problem of such perspec-
tives consists in losing our own experience of disgust: There is a discontinuity, that these 
perspectives do not manage to account for, between such mechanism and what we hu-
mans experience when we feel disgust. This would be no problem at all if these studies 
did not come to deprive the experience of disgust of any gravity and significance in our 
lives. This move is very expensive inasmuch as it would prevent us from understanding 
disgust in a way consistent with our experience of it. Indeed, it seems to be very difficult 
to say anything about an emotion without presupposing the experience that one has of 
it. Subsequently, as Kelly (2011) tries to do, such perspectives should propose a plausi-
ble way to recompose the whole phenomenon of disgust after breaking it up into pieces. 
I will try to come back to this point briefly below, even though it is not the theme of my 
paper. 
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This conclusion, radical as it may sound, would be likely 
more acceptable if Rozin and Fallon’s justification of the psycho-
logical contamination thesis did not rely on the hypothesis of a 
fundamental pattern of human thought, which they describe by 
the two laws of the “sympathetic magic”: the law of contagion and 
the law of similarity. The first law, which they summarise as “once 
in contact, always in contact” (Rozin and Fallon 1987, 30), states 
that things which once got in contact with each other continue to 
influence each other forever afterwards. This is typical in case of 
disgusting object that contact non-disgusting objects: the latter 
become immediately disgusting. The second law, that of similarity, 
states that if things look alike, this resemblance points to a fun-
damental similarity or even identity between them. Therefore, a 
non-disgusting object that resemble a disgusting one might be 
considered to be as disgusting as the latter.  
This way, Rozin and Fallon explain our revulsion at the 
prospect of eating animals as a sort of psychological illusion 
grounded on one of the structures of our thought, which makes us 
shudder in front of animals because they resemble us human be-
ings (law of similarity) and because we unacknowledgedly believe 
that, by eating them, we will take on their properties (law of con-
tagion) up to (ideally) becoming animals ourselves. The deep 
causes of disgust (animal avoidance, unacknowledged belief) be-
come effective thanks to the psychical pattern of magical thinking. 
While the first two causes show the path toward a universal way 
of becoming oneself insofar as they belong to the class of beliefs, 
the third cause of disgust consists in a mechanism that activates in 
dependence on the two former causes but independently from 
who one has become, by projecting an attribute (“contaminant”) 
to objects selected through the culture one belongs to. This fun-
damental pattern of human thought is the factual ground for 
founding the adaptive justification of disgust on its capacity to 
provide “a powerful way to transmit culture. Endowing the rejec-
tions of certain substances with strong negative affective value 
helps ensure that those rejections will be internalized and thus 
less subject to temptation or modification” (Rozin and Fallon 
1987, 33). Accordingly, disgust is a cultural emotion not only in 
the sense that cultures shape it but also in the sense that any cul-
ture needs disgust in order to be preserved and stored throughout 
generations. The emotion of disgust provides “a powerful way” to 
make a culture be immediately thought and felt as the sole de-
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scription of what things are and how we have to relate to them 
and to ourselves, and this is the ultimate evolutionary meaning of 
disgust for the two psychologists. This highly embraceable opin-
ion becomes highly problematic as soon as it makes reference to 
magical thinking. 
Nowadays, this view is difficult to be held for at least one 
reason: the recent evidence about disgust as a disease avoidance 
mechanism does not root disgust in a pattern of human thought, 
but in a programme of human affective life that activates in the 
presence of contamination risks. This allows us to hypothesise 
that disgust underwent a deep phylogenetic transformation along 
with human evolution since it started as a disease avoidance 
mechanism, up to becoming one of the strongest affective devices 
for cultural transmission. However, this is not a transformation 
that occurred once and for all: it repeats every time within the on-
togenetic development of every human being. Now, one could ob-
ject that this situation is similar to that of “magical thinking”: 
there is a mechanism that works independently from, and comes 
before, the human ‘self’. Just as the pattern of human thought 
regulated by the laws of sympathetic magic, the disease avoidance 
mechanism would underlie our formation as persons. Further-
more, this hypothesis does not seem to solve the problem of the 
discontinuity between the disease avoidance mechanism and the 
wider and significantly different human experience of disgust.4 My 
answer is that, on the contrary, my hypothesis make us able to 
think of ‘disgust’ as a result: for each human being the “disease 
avoidance mechanism” becomes ‘disgust’ (that is, something dif-
ferent) because of the cultural and psychical pressures (together 
with biological ones) that merge with it. Put in different words, I 
hypothesise a sort of permeability among the different processes 
at work, at least in the development of the human self. This makes 
my hypothesis consistent with the holistic view on disgust insofar 
as it supports the idea that disgust integrates within one’s devel-
opment. In opposition, magical thinking is a structure of thought, 
which remains unaltered and presupposed throughout the ontog-
eny of the human being and which culture simply endows with the 
information concerning what is disgusting and what is not.  
                                                     
4 So different that Rozin and Fallon state “although it probably has some adaptive value 
as protection against microbial (physical) contamination, psychological contamination 
seems on balance to be maladaptive in that it in most instances it motivates rejection of 
nutritive substances” (Rozin and Fallon 1987, 29). 
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As for the problem of the discontinuity between the disease 
avoidance mechanism and the wider and significantly different 
human experience of disgust, it needs scientific evidence to be 
really clarified. Without such evidence, there cannot be any simply 
conceptual understanding of this discontinuity. At least in this pa-
per, which aims to be strictly philosophical, my task must limit it-
self to providing the right conceptual framework to conceive of 
the path from the disease avoidance mechanism to what we prop-
erly call disgust; such a path, however, can only be clarified 
through other instruments, first of all through experiments and 
the analysis of empirical data. 
Another problem with Rozin and Fallon’s cultural evolution-
ary hypothesis to justify disgust – a view which Rozin has recently 
defended again (Rozin and Haidt 2013) – is that it does not leave 
any room to the intuitive and plausible idea that with that “strong 
negative affective value”, which characterises our culturally loa-
ded rejection of some things, we express disgust reasonably. In-
stead, for Rozin and Fallon, disgust is irrational for substantial 
reasons, that is to say, disgust is irrational independently from 
who one is and from the environment where one grew up. Con-
trarily, the holistic view on disgust roots this emotion in the fact 
that one’s self was shaped within a given culture. From this per-
spective, disgust is not essentially irrational. It may be dealt with 
as rational or irrational on the basis of its appraisal by both those 
who feel disgust and the group where one feels such an emotion. 
This means that disgust can undergo a critique, and this critique 
can evaluate disgust before a given object as rational. As we shall 
see in the next section, this has consequences for the general topic 
of a just society. 
Self- and cultural preservation, animal avoidance, sensitivity 
for contamination: all these aspects regulated by disgust seem to 
indicate at least another ground for this emotion, which has to do 
with our concrete existence as human beings, who conceive of and 
perceive ourselves in a way that merges together cultural, collec-
tive and personal instances. We are who we are only because we 
grew up in one culture that, mediated by our caregivers, blends 
with biological developmental programmes (including those per-
taining disgust) and, together with our own experiences, shapes 
the concrete persons we are. In this story, disgust seems to have 
the precise function of detecting and recognising what is not ap-
propriate to our “ideational” nature (be it true or not), i.e. what 
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does not ideationally belong to us (be it true or not) – in a nut-
shell: who we are not.  
 
3. Disgust and the Problem of a Just Society 
So far, I have tried to shift the understanding of disgust from Ro-
zin and Fallon’s irrational view to a holistic view that bestows dis-
gust with a rational kernel, while granting to it a fundamental ar-
bitrariness. This is no paradox nor is it a naive or deeply illogical 
viewpoint. Indeed, I claim that disgust expresses a stance (better, 
my stance) over both the world and the subject who perceives it 
(me). Accordingly, disgust expresses my position within the 
world, where ‘my position’ is by no means a particular standpoint 
on a certain theme, but describes the way I deeply (even unac-
knowledgedly) conceive of and perceive myself in relationship to 
the world where I grew up (that is, my world, or better, my cul-
tural world). In this sense, disgust expresses who one is not, 
where ‘is’ has by no means a strictly ontological meaning but de-
scribes the way I deeply see myself. Indeed, the verb ‘to be’ is the 
only one I really have to describe myself. Either way, disgust does 
this in a negative and aversive way.  
Now, the time has come to go back to Nussbaum’s account of 
disgust in order to show the advantages of embracing the holistic 
view for a just society. In her account of disgust, Martha Nuss-
baum seems to deprive disgust of its gravity and significance. Yet, 
she delegitimates disgust in a way that differs from Rozin and 
Fallon’s. She accepts their idea that there is a fundamental pattern 
of our thought that obeys to the law of sympathetic magic, but she 
loosens the knot between food, animalness and disgust (Nuss-
baum 2006, 92). Referring to Becker (1973), she claims that dis-
gust is triggered by items that remind us both of our animal vul-
nerability and of our mortality. As already shown in the first sec-
tion, we do not fully reject animalness per se, but only its vulner-
able aspect, which relates to death as well as to spoilage and de-
cay. Subsequently, disgust is not a food-related emotion but rather 
expresses our rejection of our vulnerability. In this sense, we do 
not risk taking on the properties of disgusting objects but rather 
becoming more vulnerable and weaker. This, however, is an effect 
of magical thinking (and of the psychological sense of contamina-
tion), that is to say, it is the consequence of a projection, some-
thing that is added to the reality in front of which one reacts with 
disgust. Here it thus becomes possible to weaken disgust itself and 
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to make its (public) claims and its role in the law appear ridicu-
lous. However, the neutralisation of disgust has its costs: first of 
all, as already observed, it implies considering this emotion fully 
unreasonable. But this is at odds with the idea that it is a deeply 
culturally shaped emotion, which always involves us intimately. 
Cultures settle in our lives and survive throughout generations in-
sofar as they provide reasons to live. Persons too have their ideas 
on life and give reasons for them. It is difficult to conceive of hu-
man emotions as fully detached from the rational animals that we 
are: thus, we can provide reasons for our emotions too. These rea-
sons may be more or less strong and reasonable, but they always 
occur within the discursive practice of a given society, by means of 
which one acquires most of one’s cultural values and, above all, 
through which one can even change one’s mind and try to influ-
ence one’s emotional reactions. Neutralising disgust thus implies, 
first, distrusting people and their rational capacities and, second, 
not seeing its fundamental role in shaping who a person is.  
A further point concerns the distinction between an actual 
experience of disgust and the use of disgust independently from 
such an experience: The disgusted person conceives of the dis-
gusting object in a very different way from those who refer to dis-
gust and project disgusting properties on persons and things 
without feeling disgust. Downgrading disgust to an unreasonable 
or even irrational emotion blurs the line that differentiates the 
second experience from the first one, while they are characterised 
by different reasons and affective qualities, as we have seen in the 
first section. In order to overcome disgust for social and justice 
purposes, I find it more profitable to take disgust in earnest in 
both situations. If disgust is the emotion that points out a problem 
of identity and difference between human beings and the other 
beings that elicit it, then both actually felt disgust and simply used 
disgust point out this same problem in two incomparable ways. 
One expresses a stance over the object of disgust, and this stance 
sounds like: “You are not who I am”. This is evident and unprob-
lematic with regard to most items in the world, but disgusting 
items dim such evidence and require that one affirms it violently: 
by means either of actual revulsion or of a discriminating behav-
iour. I claim that the reason for that is to be found neither, as for 
Rozin and Fallon, in the prospect of the oral incorporation of the 
disgusting items or the similarity of an object with disgusting 
ones, nor, as for Nussbaum, in any prospects of vulnerability, nor, 
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finally, in any magical thinking. Instead, one either feels or uses 
disgust whenever there is an object that seems to be part of one’s 
life (be it due to resemblance or ordinariness) but is actually not. 
And ‘actually’ does not mean any realistic stance, according to 
which one really refers to something disgusting per se out there, 
but, as said, it means a deep cultural and personal stance. Despite 
their differences on both the affective and the cognitive side, both 
behaviours refer to disgust and make use of the entire set of prop-
erties and words pertaining to this emotion because they follow 
the sole rule of affirming by negation the difference between the 
person who is disgusted (be they actually disgusted or just refer-
ring to disgust without actually feeling it) and the disgusting ob-
ject or person.  
This is possible because, during one’s development in a 
given society, one has been shaped in such a way that might no 
longer even contemplate seeing certain things. Later, one becomes 
able to reproduce this selective competence also in other contexts, 
which have nothing to do with the original ones. To the extent of 
actual disgust, I do not need to be even partially aware of such se-
lective process, just as I do not need to be aware that my language 
is mine and other people are not barbarians (etymologically “stut-
terers”) because they do not speak my own language. As said, dis-
gust is part of my equipment for facing the world. I can delve into 
myself and my culture to find the deep reasons that lead me to feel 
disgust in the presence of something, but likely I won’t be able to 
find them because they are largely arbitrary. Insects, stenches, fe-
ces and the like are typical disgusting objects, that is to say they 
are mostly not arbitrary objects of disgust, insofar as they corre-
spond to the objects of the disease avoidance mechanism. How-
ever, human beings do not experience them as disgusting because 
they are pathogen-givers: this is a recently acquired awareness, 
which has profited from the discoveries in the fields of biology 
and medicine and makes disgust overlap with fear. In the pres-
ence of insects, disgust mostly seems to be irrational, whereas 
fear may be an appropriate emotion. This fundamental irrational-
ity of disgust is different from that attributed to it by Rozin, Fallon 
and Nussbaum insofar as, first, it can be the object of public dis-
pute and reasoning and, second, it relies on the arbitrary differ-
ence that one marks as a singular person who has grown up in a 
given culture. This is the reason why our actual experience of dis-
gust resembles more to crossing borders. Indeed, disgust marks a 
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distance from its correlative items wherever such items get 
proximate to us (s. Kolnai 1929, 72) in order to defend one’s own 
integrity. And that integrity is what makes one the person one 
perceives oneself to be. In this sense, disgust has been correctly 
defined a defensive emotion.  
As for the use of disgust, I am much more able to account for 
my use of it and a careful analysis can easily lead me to acknowl-
edge that the reasons for my alleged disgust are racial hatred, 
compensative self-affirmation, etc. In these situations, disgust is 
more of a means to hurt and discriminate, therefore to attack 
somebody, rather than a way to defend oneself by chasing the dis-
gusting object away. This form of disgust is by no means the emo-
tion of disgust: it is a behaviour that follows the rules of disgust 
but that is rooted in different experiences and emotions. Actual 
disgust makes us feel like who or what we are not. Making use of 
disgust does serve to distinguish us from who or what we are not 
(it builds a border). Actual disgust exhibits so a strong relation-
ship between humans and what they are not that humans react 
with a violent rejection: revulsion. Thus, when someone makes 
use of disgust without feeling it, she is referring to this strong and 
rejected relationship between her and the object of disgust.  
This does not mean that one cannot feel genuine disgust in 
the presence of someone or a group of people, nor that one would 
be justified for this in some sense. In this perspective, disgust 
never hides from humanity, but always unveils our concrete hu-
manity. Still, the real advantage of a holistic view on disgust con-
sists in the fact that disgust can always be a matter of discussion 
and reason-giving practices, of assessment and appraisal, and, fi-
nally, it urges us to account for our disgust, that is to say, for our 
stances on the world, a world where we feel the disgusting item 
should not have any citizenship at all. On the contrary, Nuss-
baum’s view makes disgust a non-disputable emotion insofar as it 
relies on a thought pattern that is substantially irrational. This as-
sumption poses difficulties to her great endeavour to show how 
our mind has changed with regard to disgusting objects and prac-
tices. Consider the gay-rights movements. Indeed, the Western 
mind has changed throughout the last few decades because our 
prejudices have been challenged by homosexuals. This was only 
possible because disgust is a plastic emotion, which speaks of we 
are in relationship to our world within a given culture. That is, 
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disgust is in principle a reasonable emotion. So far I have tried to 
contend exactly this point.  
This way, it becomes not only possible but also necessary to 
put under criticism the emotion of disgust and its use in public as 
well as legal context. Thus, its role in law-making or appraising a 
given behaviour as illegal appears reasonable, once again insofar 
as it reveals our stance over the world (more starkly, it reveals 
who we are). Also, it appears even profitable because this appear-
ance favours those discursive practices that allow us both to be-
come more aware of how we perceive ourselves and what our 
deep attitudes are, and to try and shape them as well as our soci-
ety in the way we believe to be the best and most just.  
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